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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Lustig v. Congregation B'Nai Israel,98 the Supreme Court, Kings
County, in adherence to the position of the Second Department, held
that a 3211(c) motion is analogous to one brought under 3212 and,
therefore, the same rules should govern.99 The Third Department
has expressed a similar view. 00
Professor David Siegel agrees with the approach taken by the
First Department, asserting that there is no indication in the lan-
guage of CPLR 3211(c) that a court's power to grant summary judg-
ment is limited to post-joinder motions. Moreover, since seven out
of ten objections listed under CPLR 3211(a) must be made before
answer, the authority conferred by 3211(c) would be useless if the
movant were compelled to await joinder of issue.' 01 Hopefully, the
conflict will soon be resolved by the Court of Appeals.10 2
CPLR 3213: Support clause in. separation agreement considered an
instrument for the payment of money.
The seemingly clear and unequivocal language of CPLR 3213103
continues to present problems of interpretation as courts, hindered
by the absence of definitive precedent, 0 4 strive to discern what in-
struments are included in the phrase "instrument for the payment
of money only."'05 The basis for this dilemma is the apparent conflict
between the revisors' intent and the statute as finally enacted. For,
the intendment was to provide a speedy method for adjudicating
98 62 Misc. 2d 216, 308 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1970).
9 See Pisano v. County of Nassau, 41 Misc. 2d 844, 246 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1963), aff'd without opinion, 21 App. Div. 2d 754, 252 N.YS.2d 22 (2d Dep't 1964).
100 See Milk v. Gottschalk, 29 App. Div. 2d 698, 286 N.Y.S.2d 39 (3d Dep't 1968). This
holding apparently supersedes the decision granting pre-joinder summary judgment in
Dana v. Board of Supervisors, 48 Misc. 2d 876, 266 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence
County 1966).
101 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, commentary 45, at 49 (1970).
102 In any event, all of the departments are in agreement that a court should advise
the parties that a motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment.
See, e.g., Mareno v. Kibbe, 32 App. Div. 2d 825, 302 N.Y.S.2d 324 (2d Dep't 1969).
103 CPLR 3213 permits the service of a summons and motion for summary judgment
in lieu of complaint when an action "is based upon an instrument for the payment of
money only or upon any judgment."
104 This lack of guidance stems from the fact that the predecessors of the CPLR did
not offer a plaintiff similar relief. Moreover, the legislative documents are lacking in sug-
gestions as to when the motion should lie. See FIsr REP. 91; FrIm REP. 492; SixTH REP.
338.
105 See, e.g., Holmes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 96, 305 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1st
Dep't 1969); Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295
N.Y.S.2d 752 (1st Dep't 1968); Orenstein v. Orenstein, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1969). rev'g 58 Misc. 2d 377, 295 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens
County 1968); Al-O-Matic Mfg. Corp. v. Shields, 59 Misc. 2d 199, 298 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Dist.
C. Nassau County 1969). See also The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L. Rv. 335-38
(1969).
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claims "presumptively meritorious."' 0 8 Nevertheless, when the statute
is analyzed with reference to this intent, no mention is made of such
claims; instead, the precise requirement of a "money only" instru-
ment is utilized.
In Wagner v. Cornblum,07 a 3213 motion was permitted in an
action to recover support payments under a separation agreement.
Rejecting the Orenstein v. Orenstein'08 approach, the court chose to
adopt the viewpoint of one authority that "the money clause in a
separation agreement can be separately regarded and sustained for
CPLR 3213 use."' 0 9
The arguments for both sides of the conflict over whether a sep-
aration agreement falls within the ambit of CPLR 3213 are well rea-
soned. On one hand, it is posited that unlike negotiable or nonnego-
tiable instruments in the commercial sense, a separation agreement
is not directed solely toward the payment of money."x0 Rather, the
gravamen of these post-marriage contracts is to delineate the various
rights and obligations of the parties, support being merely one such
duty.
On the other hand, it is maintained that the separation agree-
ment usually falls within the criterion enunciated in Seaman-Andwall
Corp. v. Wright Machine Corp.," i.e., that an instrument satisfies
CPLR 3213 if a prima facie case would be established by proof of
the instrument and a failure to make the payments called for by its
terms. Accordingly, a preliminary determination of a 3213 motion
should be based on the propriety of the motion 12 rather than the
merits of the case, i.e., whether or not a defense to the claim is pre-
sented." 3
Even if it were established that CPLR 3213 is limited to com-
mercial transactions, the separation agreement would still not be ex-
cluded since many courts have recognized the commercial indicia of
106 See FiRsr REP. 91. See also 4 WK&M 3213.01.
107 62 Misc. 2d 161, 308 N.Y.$.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1970).
108 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1969).
109 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3218, commentary 4, at 832 (1970).
110 Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, clauses of a separation agreement are
"dependent" on one another. Hence, a husband can defend a support action on the
ground that his wife breached another clause, e.g., visitation rights. See Greene v. Greene,
31 Misc. 2d 1009, 221 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1961). But see Walker v.
Walker, 23 App. Div. 2d 764, 258 N.Y.S.2d 585 (2d Dep't 1965).
M 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1st Dep't 1968).
112 Cf. Holmes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 33 App. Div. 2d 96, 305 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1st Dep't
1969).
113 Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d
752 (1st Dep't 1968).
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these agreements. 1 4 Unfortunately, however, the refusal to extend the
benefits of CPLR 3213 could be motivated by the fact that this is the
safer approach. For, the denial of a 3213 motion only prolongs the
action; it does not even foreclose a subsequent motion under CPLR
3212.115 Nevertheless, it is anomalous to deny the possibly destitute
spouse the advantages of CPLR 3213 while affording such relief in
commercial transactions."16
CPLR 3216: Service of forty-five day demand by ordinary mail per-
mitted where no prejudice is shown.
One year after joinder of issue, a motion to dismiss for lack of
prosecution may be heard, provided that the motion is preceded by
a demand for a note of issue. 1 7 If the note of issue is filed within
forty-five days, all delay is forgiven."i8 However, the failure to comply
with the demand warrants dismissal, either sua sponte or by motion
of the aggrieved party, unless the recalcitrant party exhibits a meri-
torious cause of action and a justifiable excuse for the delay."19 Al-
though dismissal is usually without prejudice' 20 its implications are
obvious if the statute of limitations has run. For, CPLR 205 specifi-
cally excepts a dismissal under GPLR 3216 from its ambit.' 2 '
The imminency of a malpractice suit in the above situation im-
pels familiarity with the exact procedures to be followed; yet, the
constitutional dimensions of CPLR 3216 have pervaded judicial con-
struction of the section. 22 Now that the constitutionality of the sec-
114 See Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 24 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied.
385 U.S. 833 (1966); Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 52 Misc. 2d 437, 275 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966). See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
115 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary 4, at 832 (1970).
116 Id.
117 CPLR 3216. A condition precedent to the motion is that a year must have elapsed
between the joinder of issue and the hearing date for the motion to dismiss. Hence, CPLR
3216 would seem to sanction a demand for a note of issue served 45 days before the end
of the first year. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentary 16, at 926 (1970).
118 See Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 303 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1969).
119 CPLR 3216(e). For a list of the factors that a court should take into consideration
when passing on a 3216 motion, see Sortino v. Fisher, 20 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d
186 (Ist Dep't 1963).
120 CPLR 3216(a). See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3216, commentaries 12-13, at 922-25
(1970).
121 CPLR 205 permits the commencement of a new action within six months of ter-
mination despite the fact that the statute of limitations has run. However, it expressly
excepts termination due to a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal for neglect to prose-
cute, or a final judgment on the merits. See 1 WK&M 205.06.
122 See Cohn v. Borchard Affiliations, 25 N.Y.2d 237, 250 N.E.2d 690, 803 N.Y.S.2d 68
(1969). For a discussion of the history of CPLR 3216, including amendments and judicial
hostility, see 7B McKINNEYs CPLR 3216, commentaries 1-4, at 910-17 (1970).
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